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Abstract 
This thesis explores questions which have vexed both philosophers and sociologists. 
These are questions which, to varying degrees remain unanswered, but which, 
nonetheless, are basic questions pertaining to our existence. Just what is the nature 
of the ' subject'? Can we even say that the 'subject' exists? What is consciousness? 
What role does language play in defining the subject? What is ' truth'? Is there a 
'truth'? How much autonomy does the subject have? The main question, though, 
posed in this thesis relates to whether we are: Prisoners of our own Consciousness? 
It is from a reading of the writings of certain late twentieth century French thinkers 
that the above questions are considered. The four writers: Jean Paul Sartre, Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Pierre Bourdieu, offer their views. Whilst Jean Paul 
Sartre advocates atheistic existentialism, the remaining three French theorists have 
been labelled post-structuralists, a term given, rather than claimed. 
Whilst Sartre, Foucault, Derrida and Bourdieu have differing views on the above 
questions, there are points of congruence. The elusiveness of the subject is one such 
point of agreement. There is also agreement amongst the four (less overtly expressed 
by Derrida) that freedom of the subject is a possibility. For Sartre, freedom is the 
very essence of humankind. The thinkers differ on the matter of ' truth'. Sartre 
believes in an absolute truth, Foucault deals with 'regimes of truth '. Derrida remains 
somewhat silent, except that he contends there is a justice, which does not exist but 
which is an ideal and is infinitely irreducible. Bourdieu unashamedly believes all 
scientists are seeking the truth, and he proposes a method which he believes will 
assist in the pursuit of that goal. Each of the four theorists contends, to some degree, 
that language and discourse are constructed by the social world and influence our 
perception of reality. 
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Regarding the notion of being 'prisoners of our own consciousness?', the theorists 
under scrutiny, with the exception of Sartre, believe we are seriously constrained by 
language and discourse. Foucault and Bourdieu are of the opinion that knowledge 
may free us from this predicament. 
I suggest that humankind is neither free, nor non-free. Rather, that the ' subject' 
merely Is. I suggest that we are not prisoners because to endorse such a view, would 
be to accept that we are being detained from a realm which would be our 'normal' 
realm. Given that there is no realm other than the present, and given that constraints 
are consistent with the nature of humankind, we cannot be said to be prisoners. 
Further, it is argued that not only our consciousness defines us but also our 
unconsciousness. And both consciousness and unconsciousness, in turn, are defined 
by the social world in which we live. 
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Introduction 
The question pertaining to whether we are 'prisoners of our own consciousness', 
is explored in this thesis. In order to examine the intricacies of this question, 
answers to several other questions need to be found: To what degree does the 
subject have autonomy? What is the subject? Can I ever define myself as 
subject? Or, is it that at the very moment that I become conscious of the 'I' , it has 
changed its essence into the ' subjectum', a product of consciousness? What is 
consciousness? If I am a prisoner of my own consciousness, does that mean 
consciousness is an agent, an entity in itself? Or, at the moment when I am aware 
of consciousness, does not consciousness become the object, a matter which is 
reflected upon? Can reflected-upon consciousness, in tum, become reflecting 
consciousness? Is there nothing beyond consciousness? What about my 
unconsciousness? Are we incarcerated by language and language signs? Is there 
any possibility for the subject to choose or alter its state of affairs? What degree 
of freedom does the subject have? Does the subject yearn for something outside 
of itself? Is that something, absolute truth? What is truth? 
The ramifications of participation in cyberspace throw new light on the subject as 
a ' shifting subject'. Some say the subject will no longer have a 'real life' identity 
but will be fluid and de-centred, perhaps reduced to a mere floating sign (Chia-yi 
Lee, 1996). The critics of cyberspace point to the inherent inequality in gender 
and class in the distribution of the social resources of cyberspace. The fans of 
cyberspace celebrate the liberating possibilities of the deconstruction of the 
subject and the construction of a new heterogeneous, 'playful' subject. 
Whatever position one holds on what is termed 'cyber-subjectivity', the age-old 
questions are still asked: What is the subject? What is consciousness? Is there a 
'truth'? What is the relationship between the subject and knowledge? What 
degree of freedom does the subject have? Is there anything beyond language? 
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The area I will draw on for this debate is late twentieth century French thought. 
The main theorists engaged in this particular debate are: Jean Paul Sartre (1905-
1980), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Jacques Derrida (b.1930) and Pierre 
Bourdieu (b.1930). Amongst this group of thinkers there are similarities and 
important differences. 
The mood and social circumstances in Germany and Central Europe between the 
two World Wars have been suggested as the fertile ground which offered the 
opportunity for serious questioning in regard to the search for a more secure basis 
to life . In those times of severe umest and disruption there was an eagerness to 
question the authority of held beliefs and institutions, a willingness to seek a 
better 'truth' in the subjective and psychological spheres. 
The works of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) became widely influential , 
especially in Germany, in the period between the two World Wars. His emphasis 
was on the importance of the 'existing individual' and on concepts such as 'faith ', 
'choice ' and 'despair' . Kierkegaard had a major influence on many Protestant 
theologians and existentialists. His work was associated with post-Nietzschean 
thought. However, it was from the totally secular philosophy of Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976) that French existentialism took its source. In Germany Martin 
Heidegger, Rector at Freibourg University, was the intellectual who stood out for 
his insights into all the philosophies of the shell-shocked Europe of the time. He 
seemed to appreciate people 's anxieties and their need to confer meaning on life. 
Although the fate of humankind is to perish, meaning can be bestowed on life 
through 'purposes' and ' projects '. While all the individual receives from this is 
knowledge of existence, that is precisely ' the transcendent need and desire ' of the 
individual (Mairet, 1948: 15). 
The outbreak of the Second World War also meant that French sociologists with a 
philosophic leaning, had been cut off from adequate funding for empirical 
research and were unable to reconcile any empirical research with theory. After 
the War the intellectual field became dominated by philosophy and, more 
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particularly, by existentialism. This seemed to be the beginning of a break with 
traditional European sociology. 
Twenty years later, in the 1960' s, specific events occurred (/es evenements) which 
further positioned young French revolutionaries and French thinkers. This period 
represents ' a watershed moment in the history of French thought ' (Starr, 1995: 4). 
In 1960 Jean-Paul Sartre published, Critique of Dialectic Reason, which was 
essentially an attempt to develop Marxism through existentialism, defining the 
latter as ' a subordinate ideology' (Sartre, 1963 :viii). In 1963 Sartre published, 
The Problem of Method, in which he criticizes Marxists of the day for trying to 
maintain a ' dialectic without men' (Sartre, 1963: xiii). Sartre is reacting against 
the notion of any external law being imposed on the subject. It is only through the 
subject' s materiality that the subject relates to the world, but this relationship 
could not occur without ' free consciousness ' which allows the subject to take a 
point of view. Is it coincidental that the following works were published in the 
same year: Althusser ' s For Marx in September 1965, Jacques Derrida' s Of 
Grammatology in December 1965, Michel Foucault ' s The Order of Things m 
April 1966, Jacques Lacan ' s Ecrits in November 1966 and Julia Kristeva' s Word, 
Dialogue and Novel in 1966? 
Two years later, 1965, saw the bombing of North Vietnam. This catalyzed the 
Left into a revolutionary mood and into a common goal of looking towards 
liberation struggles in the Third World for new models of revolutionism. 1965 
also saw the dissolution of the student organization of the French communist 
party. That group disbanded into two further groups: the Trotskyist jeunesse 
cornmuniste revolutionnaire and the Maoist Union des j eunes rnarxistes-leninistes 
de France. 
Evidence that the idea of revolution was alive and well could be seen on May 3 
1968 from the gathering of militants in the courtyard of the Sorbonne. Their 
presence was as a protest against 'fascist terror and police repression' (Starr, 
1995 :2). There was a not too subtle implication of violence in the Gaullist order. 
Over the next two to three weeks there were several demonstrations, protests and 
sit-ins. On 10-11 May there were barricades in the Quartier Latin. On May 13 
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there was a General Strike. Events gathered momentum. Trade unionists joined 
with factory workers and lycees. There was a triumphant procession through the 
Left Bank and slowly daily life came to a halt. On May 29 General de Gaulle 
took refuge at Baden-Baden French military outpost, a refuge from which he saw 
current events as a communist inspired paralysis of the country. On the following 
day some sense of normality had returned and on the evening of May 30, after de 
Gaulle had promised a referendum on his presidency, half a million people 
marched up the Champs Elysees in his support. These were the 'May Events' of 
1968. 
The 'May Events' brought together Christian leftists, anarchists, Maoists, 
Trotskyists, situationists, Marxist-Leninists and any number of groups calling for 
the overthrow of bureaucratic structures, the overthrow of the capitalist order. 
Some groups were calling for sexual liberation, self-management and overcoming 
the disalienation of the subject. Environmental groups were calling for more 
effective use of urban space and protection from over-use of technology. 
''' Difference" was the password and the right to difference the fundamental stake 
in political struggles .. . the celebration of difference stood athwart the political. .. ' 
(Starr, 1995 :7). 
'L 'apres-Mai ' is the expression often used to explain the works of French thinkers 
after Les evenements of May 1968. What characterized this thought was, as 
already mentioned, the celebration of difference. Along with difference as a focal 
point there was also a commonality in play upon discontinuity and continuity, a 
recognition of the importance of fragments and fissures, and an elaboration of the 
explication de texte . Language is of central concern to 'post-structuralist' writers 
such as Foucault, Bourdieu and Derrida who show that discourse' ... obscures and 
mystifies the constructed character of subjects and truths ' ( Allen and Young, 
1989:5). 
There are arguments about the role or influence of history on philosophy. Some 
movements pride themselves for being anti-historical. However, it is generally 
accepted that there are perhaps 'accidents' of history which may not be significant 
national events, but developments occurring in one field or other of human 
5 
endeavour which attract the minds and following of others. A particular line, or 
particular lines, of philosophic thought become the norm, often replacing known 
'language'. Bernstein (1992:27) contends that: 'After a while, because of some 
other historical accidents - like the appearance of a new genius or just plain 
boredom or sterility - another cluster of metaphors, distinctions and problems 
usurps the place of what is now a dying tradition' . To accept that history has a 
critical function in philosophical thought is not to accept that historians are 
capable of autonomous thought, nor is it to deny that any thinking has its own set 
of conventions and metaphors. Accepting the critical function of history in 
philosophical thought is admitting to the sharing of an intent ' ... to expose 
prejudgments, prejudices, and illusions ' (Bernstein, 1992:27). 
'Existential phenomenology' and 'post-structuralism' are the two late twentieth 
century French philosophical currents of thought which are used in this thesis as 
the backdrop to the discussion of conceptions of the subject. Writings of Jean Paul 
Sartre on existential phenomenology are employed to expound the existentialists ' 
position. The works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Pierre Bourdieu are 
those used to put forward the ' post-structuralist' view. 
Jean Paul Sartre was the main proponent of existential phenomenology in France 
from the mid to the late twentieth century. He was strongly influenced by the 
German philosopher, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Sartre himself described 
existentialism as a ' revolt against oversytematization' in philosophy (1948: 5). 
Existentialism is often described as anti-historical. If, as described above, the 
purpose of a philosophy is to expose illusions and prejudgments and to find new 
ways of looking at the world, the reference to history ( or past patterns of thought, 
for example, 'revolt against oversystematization') is, then, both essential and 
inevitable. 
In addition to the anti-historical label, it has been suggested that there is an 'anti-
philosophical tendency' in existential phenomenology. This understanding arises 
from the existentialist's emphasis on the subject's generation of meanings, as 
opposed to priority being given to 'reason'. 
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In response to the criticisms from the Marxists that the 'solidarity of mankind' is 
ignored in existentialism where the subject is seen in isolation, and the criticisms 
from Christian groups who maintain that ignoring eternal values ('since we ignore 
the commandments of God' (Sartre, 1948:23) is denying reality and failing to 
take cognizance of the seriousness of human affairs, Sartre responds: 
In any case we can begin by saying that existentialism, in our 
sense of the word, is a doctrine that does render human life 
possible; a doctrine, also which affirms that every truth and 
every action imply both an environment and human 
subjectivity. (Sartre, 1948:24) 
Perhaps the two main tenets of existential phenomenology which should be 
outlined here, however, are that: existence precedes essence, that is, the subject 
first of all exists and it is not until later that the subject defines itself and, 
secondly, that the human subject is free. No social or natural laws can determine 
the subject; the subject 'realizes' itself. Jean Paul Sartre's view of human 
freedom has been described as ' the most radical view of human freedom' smce 
the Epicureans (Barnes, 1963 :vii). 
' Post-structuralism' , as mentioned above, is the label most often used to describe 
the works of 'l 'apres-Mai ' French thinkers (Foucault, Derrida, Bourdieu ). The 
term, ' post-structuralism', refers to the current of philosophy which develops the 
importance placed on language by the structuralists but which sees the use of 
language as oversimplified by them (McLennan, 1989: 170). For the post-
structuralists, meaning not only resides in the utterance (which can no longer be 
seen as an entity) but the origin of meaning can no longer be pin-pointed. 
Language is of central concern to the post-structuralists but in the way that post-
structuralists encourage de-construction of discourse to at least the point of 
recognition that language (especially Western metaphysics) ' obscures and 
mystifies the constructed character of subjects and truths' (Allen and Young, 
1989:5). The post-structuralists' emphasis on deconstruction of texts is often 
termed ' literary criticism'. 
Although Foucault did not accept any labelling in terms of belonging to one 
particular school of thought, he is generally categorized by commentators as 
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belonging to the French philosophical current, 'post-structuralism'. Like Sartre, 
Michel Foucault held a position of ' moral authority ' in France. Like Sartre, he 
involved himself with many generous public causes, but while he was compared 
to Sartre, 'ii nuovo Sartre' by the Italian press (L 'Europeo, 18 February 1977), I 
would suggest that the differences are far greater than J.G. Merquior suggests in 
his book, Foucault (1985). The differences are in the degree of autonomy 
afforded to the subject and, subsequently, the degree of freedom which the subject 
can exerc1ze. 
In regard to the concept of discourse, Foucault's emphasis on the context rather 
than the text includes a far broader context than those of his contemporaries 
(sometimes described as ' literary theorists ' ). For the structuralists, ' death of the 
subject' was a slogan, for the post-structuralists language, or more specifically the 
deconstruction of language, is a central concern. Derrida points to his continual 
reference to l 'autre' in his discussions of language: ' It is totally false to suggest 
that deconstruction is a suspension of reference. Deconstruction is always deeply 
concerned with the "other" of language ' (quoted in Brannigan et al. , 1996:154). 
It is important here to take a brief look at the ' labelling' used in this thesis. I have 
already used terms that would be unacceptable to some of the theorists engaged in 
this debate. Foucault would not have accepted the label, ' post-structuralist', or 
any other label for that matter. Bourdieu suggests that ' sociology' rather than 
'philosophy ' offers a ' far truer vision of the world ' (quoted in Murray, 1992:136). 
Bourdieu scorns 'philosophy ' for engaging in ' prophetic and metaphysical 
posturing' (1992 : 136). On the other hand, he describes sociology as an 'esoteric 
science ' . 
Bernstein in The New Constellation is careful to use 'scare quotes' around such 
labels as 'modernity' , ' post-modernism' and 'post-structuralism' . He warns that 
the labels are: 
... slippery, vague and ambiguous. They have wildly different 
meanings with different cultural disciplines and even within 
the same discipline. There is no consensus or agreement about 
the multiple meanings of these treacherous terms. ( 1992: 11) 
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For some the very labelling process assumes that the 'school' has a 'truth' 
compared to which all other bodies of belief are less 'true'. Vincent Descombes, 
in Modern French Philosophy (1979: 1), states that contemporary philosophy 
cannot be aligned to a particular philosophical period or school: ' ... (French 
philosophy) is coincident with the sum of the discourses elaborated in France and 
considered by the public today to be philosophical' . 
Finally, a comment from Jacques Derrida: 'fl y a peut-etre des pensee plus 
pensantes que cette pensee qu 'on appelle philosophie. ' There are perhaps 
thoughts more thoughtful than thinking that goes by the name of philosophy. 
(quoted in Didier Cahen, Diagraphe, 1987:11-27). 
Notwithstanding the above comments, I choose to employ 'a common language ', 
providing extra explanations and definitions where required. Suffice to say, I 
heed the warnings of Bernstein, above, in regard to the lack of consensus in the 
use of terms. 
The first four chapters in this thesis examine how each of the four selected late 
twentieth century French thinkers, Sartre, Foucault, Derrida and Bourdieu, deals 
with the following specific questions: What is the subject? What is 
consciousness? The autonomy of the subject? The role of language? The matter 
of truth? Chapter One deals with selected readings of Jean Paul Sartre, Chapter 
Two focuses on the writings of Jacques Derrida, Chapter Three concentrates on 
selected works of Michel Foucault, and Chapter Four is concerned with the 
writings of Pierre Bourdieu. At the conclusion of each Chapter is a Discussion 
section. This section, firstly, discusses any apparent conflicts or unresolved issues 
found in the writings of the particular thinker and, then, concludes with a 
comment on how the author would answer the question relating to whether we are 
prisoners of our own consciousness. 
In Chapter Five I outline the similarities and differences, along with the perceived 
ambiguities and conflicts, found in the writings of the four twentieth century 
French thinkers. Further, I elaborate on problems which remain unanswered and 
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which need future debate. Finally, I draw together the conclusions from the 
previous chapters, specifically in regard to each of the major thinkers on the 
question, 'prisoners of our own consciousness?' 
After examining French thought of the late twentieth century do we agree with 
Sartre that the subject is 'condemned to be free', or with Bourdieu, who espouses 
that the subject has the possibility of freedom when it becomes conscious of the 
laws governing the situation? Derrida offers a range of 'futures for 
deconstruction'. Is that where the freedom of the subject lies, or is it in the work 
of diakrisis (discrimination) which Foucault tells us is 'a guarantee of freedom'? 
That is, in the discrimination of visible representations, not to look for hidden 
meanings but to ' accept in the relation to the self only that which can depend on 
the subject's free and rational choice' (Foucault, 1984:64). 
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1 Jean Paul Sartre 
1.1 Introduction 
Jean Paul Sartre (1905- 1980) had a major influence on French intellectual life for 
a period of twenty years. He was also an immensely popular figure and it is 
reported that 50,000 people followed his funeral cortege. Although he was not the 
first existentialist, nor was his form of existentialism the only type of 
existentialism, he is credited with putting existentialism on the philosophical map. 
' Being' comes before knowledge, 'existence comes before essence ' (Sartre, 
1948:26), this is the basic tenet of existentialism. Both Christian existentialism 
and atheistic existentialism share this position. Being is subjective and cannot be 
made a topic of objective inquiry. Sartre espoused atheistic existentialism 
declaring that ' .. . if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence 
comes before its essence. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human 
reality' (1948 :28) . On atheistic existentialism Sartre comments: 
Existentialism is not atheist in the sense that it would exhaust 
itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It 
declares, rather, that even if God existed that would make no 
difference from its point of view. Not that we believe God 
does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His 
existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to 
understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a 
valid proof of the existence of God. (Sartre, 1948:56) 
Sartre criticizes the social sciences for formulating categories of ' hidden realities' 
such as collective consciousness, social forces, human nature and the like. His 
position is that such categories ' betray the concrete experience of human life since 
such notions lend the illusion of objectivity to existence which is essentially a 
false objectivity' (Hayim, 1996: 136). These so-called hidden realities have the 
tendency to objectify the subject and view the subject from a God-like position. 
Rather, it is Sartre's contention that social struggles are best understood from the 
position of 'concrete' human behaviour in actual historical circumstances. 
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The above view will be developed throughout this Chapter. And a fundamental 
question asked will be: How do Sartre's preferred categories, 'a human 
universality of condition' and 'human kingdom', really differ from the concept of 
'human nature' which he says betrays 'the concrete experience of human life'? 
(Hayim, 1996: 136). 
The term, 'regression - progression', is often used to describe the method which 
Sartre is advocating. That is, what is perceived as objectivity should be 
reconceived by the subject. What results from this method is that so-called 
objective phenomena are seen to be objectifications of choices of the subject from 
which the subject is now removed and comes to view as objectivity. 
Sartre is recognized as having a radical view on human freedom. However, just 
how closely is human freedom linked to human happiness? For Sartre, there is no 
universe except for the human universe and the individual subject is ' condemned 
to be free' within that universe. This is a total freedom since there is no legislator 
other than the individual subject. According to Sartre, is it therefore impossible to 
be a prisoner of our own consciousness? 
1.2 What is the 'subject'? 
Sartre describes the subject as 'no other than a series of undertakings ... the sum, 
the organization, the set of relations that constitute these undertakings' (Sartre, 
1948:42). While he believes that there is no apparent 'universal essence' , he does 
confer on the subject a 'human universality of condition' (1948:46) in order to be 
able to describe the subject as having a human 'nature' . 
For Sartre, the subject is a product of the reflexivity of consciousness. The subject 
cannot be described as the essential core of the individual, for it is fleeting, riven 
and has no foundation: 
The 'I' who was writing or busy . .. has in fact disappeared by 
the time I try to examine it. The 'I' is now engaged in a new 
activity; the attempt to capture its essence (itself), and all it 
will be able to find therefore is its own (frustrated) attempt. I 
can never capture myself as subject, only as object. ( Howells, 
1997:29) 
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In Sartre's own words: 'The Ego only ever appears when one is not looking for it 
... By nature the Ego is fleeting ' (1957:70, emphasis added). The subject exists 
prior to essence and defines itself later: 
Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives 
himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives 
himself after already existing - as he wills to be after that leap 
towards existence. And this is what people call its 
[existentialism' s] 'subjectivity'. (Sartre, 1948:28) 
While the subject cannot be described as the central foundation or core of the 
individual, we must begin from the subjective. The individual subject is free but 
cannot go beyond human subjectivity. 
Sartre's radical understanding of human freedom will be explored later, but when 
first expounded it received criticism from several quarters for giving little heed to 
both heredity and the influences of the social environment on the subject. In 
Being and Nothingness which was published in 1943 , subjects created their own 
world which was unencumbered by ' nothingness ' (neant - non-thing) . Subjects 
had the capacity to negate and rebel against anything they chose. Personal 
responsibility and creativity were the values of the individual and must be called 
upon for action, rather than relying on moral and political authority. In 1963, the 
publication of Sartre' s Critique de la Raison Dialectique outlined a very careful 
critique of the subject as it relates to the physical universe, to the group, to history 
and to political/social existence. There is a shift in Sartre's thinking on the 
subject by the time he writes this Critique. He is now more aligned to Marxist 
determinism. He bemoans the condition whereby individuals are so influenced by 
social structures that ' serialization' results, that is, a loss of self-identity. 
This is not to say that the Critique found favour amongst all of Sartre's peers. On 
the Critique Foucault commented: 'The Critique de la Raison Dialectique is a 
nineteenth century man's magnificent and pathetic attempt to think the twentieth 
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century. In that sense, Sartre is the last Hegelian, and I would even say the last 
Marxist' (quoted in Macey, 1993: 171). Be that as it may, at the time, Sartre firmly 
believed that existentialism was a subordinate ideology to Marxism, attempting to 
develop the future of Marxism. He termed existentialism a 'parasitical system 
living on the margin of knowledge, which at first it opposed but into which today 
it seeks to be integrated' (Sartre, 1963: viii). Later Sartre was to again change his 
view criticizing Marxism for maintaining a 'dialectic without men' 
(Sartre, 1963 :xiii). 
At this stage some questions pertaining to Sartre's conceptions of the subject are 
already marked for further discussion. Sartre holds that notions of collective 
structures such as those found in the social sciences 'betray the concrete 
experience of human life', leading to an illusion of objectivity. Could not the 
criticism of giving phenomena the illusion of objectivity which he lays at the door 
of the social sciences not also be laid at the door of existentialism? That is, is 
there any essential difference between the objectification of social science 
concepts such as class, collective consciousness, capitalism, social structure and 
the inevitable, inescapable objectification of phenomena such as human condition, 
consciousness and human freedom? 
Sartre despairs of the alleged ' hidden realities ' in the social sciences. These are 
the collective structures referred to above. What Sartre proposes is that the 
subject be understood from the position of concrete human behaviour in actual 
historical circumstances. What possibility is there of this occurring? Sartre does 
not see a 'universal essence' in the subject which would allow him to be able to 
define the subject as having a ' human nature' . However, he is comfortable with 
the notion that the subject has a ' human universality of condition'. Is there an 
essential difference in meaning between the two concepts? 
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1.3 Consciousness 
Being And Nothingness (1956) is assessed by many as Sartre's most important 
philosophical work. It is in this work that Sartre outlines his theory relating to 
consciousness. Postwar Europe was a ripe climate to engage in an exposition of 
the important differences between objective things and human consciousness. 
Sartre described consciousness as a non-thing (neant) which has no causal 
involvements. This, Sartre proposed, is the very foundation of human freedom. 
Detmer (1986:25) outlines Sartre's consciousness as: 
Consciousness is what it is not, because consciousness is 
characterised by its negative activities. It is only through such 
'nihilating' behaviours as imagining, doubting, abstracting, 
questioning, denying, that non-being emerges in the world. 
And Sartre himself asserts that since consciousness is: 
... the being by which Nothingness comes to the world, it must 
be its own Nothingness . . . It must arise in the world as a No. 
(Sartre, 1956:4 7) 
He defines three types of consciousness: firstly, he defines ' being-for-itself 
(conscious human experience). This is a consciousness 'which entertains itself as 
a possibility rather than as a terminal fact' (Palmer, 1995:147). Secondly, Sartre 
refers to ' unreflected consciousness '. This is a consciousness which has as its 
object something other than itself, for example, thoughts about a house or 
supermarket shopping. Unreflected consciousness is what Sartre terms our every 
day mode of practical consciousness. Thirdly, Sartre refers to 'reflected 
consciousness'. Reflected consciousness is thoughts about thoughts, thinking 
about thinking. All reflecting consciousness, then, is unreflected and a new act 
('an act of the third degree') is required in order for it to be reflected upon. 
Consciousness (reflecting) which reflects upon reflected consciousness 
mistakenly, according to Sartre, comes to see itself as 'the reified ego (object or 
reflected consciousness)', but by the very act of reflection it has ceased to be that. 
It has now become by the same act a reflecting subject (1987:30). 
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Sartre has defined consc10usness as 'a transcendental field without a subject' 
(1956:291). Consciousness is always somewhere else; it is 'diasporique ', always 
escaping identity. In self-reflection the reflecting consciousness and the reflected 
consciousness are one and the same. 
Some clarification of Sartre's positioning of the ego, the subject and 
consc10usness may be of benefit here. For Sartre, the ego is a product of 
consciousness; it is not in consciousness. Similarly, the ego is a product of the 
subject. It is the self I make, not the self which makes me who I am. Although 
grammar indicates that the 'me' is an object, and when I talk about 'me' it is as if 
I have the viewpoint of another, the ego is both the 'I' and the 'me'. 
The 'I' is a transcendent ' I'. That is, the 'I' is ' usually transcended towards an 
external activity or focus: I am running, writing, talking ' (Howells, 1997:29). It is 
the subject of the conversation, the ' talking' or the 'writing' which is the focus , 
not the 'I' who is the subject. The subject cannot be identified with 
consciousness, for the subject, too, is a product of the reflexivity of consciousness. 
We may be conscious of something but not explicitly so. For instance, we may 
not be conscious of a clock until it stops ticking. There must have been prior 
consciousness of the ticking without necessarily having been ' reflectively or 
thetically conscious ' of it (Sartre, 1987:xvi). Unconsciousness, then, as with 
consciousness, is not a reified entity. It merely has the capacity to recall past 
experiences of which we have not been explicitly aware. Every ' unreflected 
consciousness, being non-thetic conscious of itself bears a non-thetic memory that 
one can consult' (1987:xvi) . 
While Sartre, at least at one stage preferred to see existentialism as a contributing 
ideology to Marxism, there would appear to be some important differences in the 
attributes the two positions give to consciousness. In the same way that products 
of their own activities could become alienating forces for the very people who 
produced them, it was Marx's and Engels' contention in The German Ideology 
(1846) that consciousness could also have the same fate; consciousness being, 
after all, but a product of individuals' activity which could come to exert an alien 
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force and be mistakenly perceived as a material thing. For Marx and Engels, 
consciousness is integrally bound up with social practice and expectations: ' ... life 
is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life' (Marx and Engels, 
1965:47). 
The difference here seems to have come about as a result of different conceptions 
of consciousness. Marx and Engels appear to define consciousness as an object or 
product. They do not afford consciousness the diasporique state which Sartre 
gives it, that is, a consciousness which cannot be situated, for when it reflects it 
ceases to be reflected consciousness and fails to recognize itself as a reflecting 
subject which it becomes in such an action. 
Marx and Engels do not see consciousness as neant (non-thing or nothingness). 
For these two thinkers, consciousness is a product of individuals' activity closely 
bound up with social practice and expectations. It is somewhat difficult to gain 
Smire's meaning on unreflected consciousness but this appears to be the area of 
consciousness which most clearly highlights the differences in thought between 
Marxism and existentialism. Remembering Sartre's overall definition of 
consc10usness as having no causal involvement, his definition of unreflected 
consciousness as everyday consciousness of the subject thinking about things 
other than itself, points to an area where he has overlooked ( or at the least appears 
to have very much understated) the influences of socialization in defining our 
world. 
The question remains as to the nature of the causal involvements in the act of 
defining, but for Sartre to say that consciousness has no causal involvement, on 
the face of it, seems somewhat naYve. We recall unreflected consciousness has as 
its object, according to Sartre, something other than itself, for example, thoughts 
about a bird or a car. The question is: am I not employing a consciousness with 
causal involvement when I am thinking of these objects? Am I not, in the process 
of thinking about a bird or a car, somehow at the same time designating those 
objects with socially influenced definitions? Am I not, in the process of defining 
those objects, categorizing them into fields influenced by social expectations? 
While the relationship between the thinking and the production of the bird or the 
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car may not be a direct relationship, that is, the thinking may not cause the bird or 
the car to materialize, surely the thinking about the bird or the car, nonetheless, 
has some kind of causal involvement in terms of definition and expectation? 
Notwithstanding the criticism, or at the best the obscurity of Sartre's definition of 
consciousness as having no causal involvement, his clarity on the requirement for 
an 'act of the third degree ' being necessary to reflect upon unreflected 
consciousness, stresses the potential for continuity of reflection. In Sartre's 
words: 
It must be remembered that all writers who have described the 
Cognito have dealt with it as a reflective operation, that is to 
say, as an operation of the second degree. Such a Cognito is 
performed by the consciousness directed upon consciousness, 
a consciousness which takes consciousness on as an object . .. 
We are in the presence of two consciousnesses ( a reflecting 
and a reflected consciousness) one of which is conscious of the 
other ... Now my reflecting consciousness does not take itself 
for an object when I effect the Cognito. What it affirms 
concerns the reflected consciousness . . . All reflecting 
consciousness is, indeed, in itself unreflected, and a new act of 
the third degree is necessary in order to posit it. (Sartre, 
1957:44-45; emphasis added) 
The potential for continuity of reflection, and thus the potential for ever new 
insights into consciousness, is perhaps the most liberating aspect of Sartre's 
exposition on consciousness. That is not to say, the notion of the subject having 
total freedom as a result of this consciousness which he describes as neant or 
nothingness, is without difficulty. However, that is the topic of the next section of 
this Chapter. 
1.4 The autonomy of the subject 
It is in the area of freedom of the subject that Sartre is recognized as having a 
radical view. When Being and Nothingness was published in 1943 Sartre was 
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regarded as having the most radical notion of human freedom smce the 
Epicureans. 
Sartre was not interested in, and rejected any attempts to answer the question: 
Why is there something, rather than nothing? Anderson claims: 
A primary reason for this rejection was that he [Sartre] saw that 
absolute human freedom and autonomy were incompatible with 
a fundamental ontological dependency on a Creator. The later 
Sartre, however, since he insists that the human being' s essential 
dependency on other persons and on their love is not inimical to 
its freedom but, in fact, absolutely necessary for its flourishing, 
has, therefore less reason to be suspicious of attempts to account 
for reality of radically contingent beings by means of a loving 
Creator-person. (Anderson, 1993: 166) 
Sartre's contention was that because existence precedes essence, the subject has 
responsibility for what it does and becomes: ' Thus, the first effect of 
existentialism is that it puts man in possession of himself as he is, and places the 
entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his shoulders ' (Sartre, 
1948:29). So, while Sartre is saying there is total freedom on the part of the 
subject, he is also making it quite clear that the subj ect cannot go beyond human 
subjectivity. In addition to this, Sartre is stating that the free commitments which 
the subject makes, also, in some way have an influence on the commitments that 
humans make as a whole. The example Sartre gives is the choice of monogamy: 
'If I decide to marry and have children, even though this decision proceeds simply 
from my situation, from my passion or my desire, I am thereby committing not 
only myself, but humanity as a whole, to the practice of monogamy ... In 
fashioning myself! fashion man' (1948:30). 
For Sartre, the subject is free; the subject is freedom : 
We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I 
say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned because he 
did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the 
moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for 
everything he does' . (1948:34) 
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In Chapter Six we will look more closely at Sartre's description of freedom given 
here. For the moment, though, Sartre has alerted us to some puzzling activities 
regarding 'condemnation' and being 'thrown into this world' . Does this not 
appear to denote a being outside of humanity who is taking these actions? Sartre 
denies anything outside of human subjectivity. There is no universe beyond the 
human universe . Also, Sartre is saying the subject is condemned to be free 
' because [the subject] did not create itself. This raises an important question: If 
the subject did not create itself, who created the subject? 
Sartre himself asserts that at the heart and centre of existentialism is the ' absolute 
character of the free commitment' (1948 :47). The subject, first of all , exists, 
encounters itself and, later through free choices, defines and fashions itself. There 
is no presence of determinism. The subject, according to Sartre, through pursuing 
transcendent means is always projecting itself outside of itself and it is only in its 
self-surpassing that it can ' grasp objects ', thus, the subject ' is the heart and centre 
of its transcendence ' (1948:55). Sartre criticized Marxism in regard to its 
rendition of human freedom being largely determined by social factors or external 
law. For Sartre, the subject is the only legislator. He believed that the problem 
with modern Marxism was that the latter tried to maintain a ' dialectic without 
man ' and this is what hindered Marxism from further development (Sartre, 
1963 :xiii). 
The Sartrean subject' s way of ' being ' is by relating to the world. The only way 
that that relationship is possible is through: 
.. . free consciousness which allows man to assume a point of 
view of the world. But man would equally be unable to have 
any connection with matter if he did not himself possess 
materiality. (Barnes, 1963 :xiv) 
This connection with matter is what Sartre terms 'historical materialism'. The 
individual is not determined by social laws. There is always the possibility for 
altered states and change. The future remains open for fashioning. 
Anderson (1993 :73) draws our attention to what he perceives to be inconsistencies 
in Sartre's exposition on the autonomy of the subject. In Existentialism and 
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Humanism (1948), Sartre asserts that the subject cannot find any truth about itself 
save through the 'mediation of another'. Anderson contends that Sartre also 
believed the subject to be 'always lucidly aware, pre-reflectively, of myself and 
my freedom, and it is bad faith to pretend otherwise' (Anderson, 1993 :73). On the 
other hand, Detmer (1986:39) contends that 'Sartre has always recognized the 
existence of constraints upon, and limitations to freedom'. There are obvious 
questions raised here, especially in regard to the degree of autonomy which the 
subject has. 
For Sartre, while every human life is unique and the individual determines the 
quality of its life, every action of the individual has some kind of influence on 
humanity as a whole. In other words, for the existentialist, freedom is always 
situated. The subject is always in a relationship with others, social groups and 
historical events. 
The two areas of human freedom where Sartre is seen as being a proponent of a 
' most radical view of human freedom since the Epicureans' (Barnes, 1963:xiv) 
concern perhaps, firsily , the aspect of a break with the traditionai rendering of the 
duality of will and the emotions and, secondly, the belief that every action is an 
intentional action. Sartre rejects the traditional rendering of human freedom as a 
battle of the will over the emotions since such a view assumes a division between 
the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness. It is a view which is 
inadmissable for Sartre, given that what has occurred for those who hold this idea, 
is the mistaken belief that reflecting consciousness is a reified ego or reflected 
consc10usness. The fact that in the act of reflection it becomes a reflecting subject 
has been lost. The point that Sartre is making here is that there is no division 
between the will and the emotions. Reflecting consciousness is not a pure entity. 
It does not have a separate will upon which to act upon its emotions. 
The second radical aspect of Sartre's conception of human freedom bears on 
every action being intentional. This idea is linked to the above in that passions 
and emotions are described as actions and, according to Sartre, are intentional. 
An example which Sartre gives is a soldier at war. The soldier fears battle. The 
reason he fears battle is because he wants (intends) to live. The emotion of fear is 
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a fear of something and thus the emotion only has meaning in the wider context of 
the soldier's life, that is, what the soldier wills (Catalano, 1974:197). 
Human freedom is being exercised even when the resulting actions are being 
motivated by passions such as fear or anger. If a subject motivated by fear , a 
sense of rejection or protection of self withdraws into itself, it is still exercising a 
choice of human freedom. All human action is intentional and human freedom is 
present in every action: 
Thus since freedom is identical with my existence, it is the 
foundation of ends which I shall attempt to attain either by the 
will or by passionate efforts. Therefore it cannot be limited to 
voluntary acts ... In relation to freedom there is no privileged 
psychic phenomenon. All my 'modes of being' manifest 
freedom equally since they are all ways of being my own 
nothingness . . . The will is not a privileged manifestation of 
freedom. (Sartre, 1943: 444-452) 
Sartre ' s belief that the subject is ' condemned to be free ' has been variously 
interpreted. Some commentators believe Sartre saw human freedom as a 
' burden', ' onerous ' and anxiety provoking (Fay,1987:201). Others contend that 
Sartre ' s concept of freedom is a 'depreciated concept'. For even though Sartre 
gives great importance to the topic, if we are freedom, how can we discuss it as an 
attribute? (Smith, 1964:41). 
It is clear that Sartre did not present freedom as a panacea for happiness. He 
recognizes that the majority of individuals do not authenticate their existence. 
What he means is that very little thought is given to death and individuals are 
prone to reassure themselves through the worship of idols, be it science, humanity 
or some 'objective divinity ' . He describes individuals who try to escape freedom 
as having 'bad faith' , as seeking a comfortable illusion by deeming others to be 
responsible for their lot. 
My own discontent with Sartre' s notion of human freedom has not so much to do 
with whether human freedom is associated with happiness or whether it is a 
burden, but with Sartre's description of the subject being 'thrown into this world', 
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being 'condemned to be free', due to not creating itself. If there is no existence 
outside human subjectivity, how can the subject be 'condemned'? Is there a 
similarity in concept here between 'condemned to be free' and 'prisoners of our 
own consciousness'? Surely, both notions imply that there is an outside agent 
who is involved in taking an action of condemnation and imprisoning. If there is 
no outside agent beyond human subjectivity, why are the pejorative terms used? 
If the action is an action of self-condemnation, does this not indicate that the 
subject yearns for a ' truth' beyond itself? Is there such a truth? 
1.5 The role of language 
Sartre speaks of a dependency relationship between intellectual productions such 
as knowledge and language, and the social conditions of the particular time in 
which they were produced (McBride, 1991 : 103). He makes explicit his belief that 
language is formulated to promote and further the ideas of society (Sartre, 1963). 
ln this regard, Sartre 's concepts are very similar to Marxism which he claimed 
was the dominant philosophy of our epoch. 
In addition to v1ewmg language as an intellectual product, Sartre asserts that 
language, along with traditions and mores, in fact , camouflage our view on reality. 
The being-in-itself rarely confronts itself directly, but only through the medium of 
institutions such as language which have the effect of obscuring reality (McBride, 
1991 :48). This is to say that, 'Materialism which leads us to believe that material 
conditions determine belief, causes us to forget that belief - the belief in the 
primacy of materialism - is also the basis of materialism' (Montefiore, 1983 :2). In 
Sartre's words: 
In the reciprocity of conditionings, it can be seen that the 
surrounding produces the material content and that the 
surrounding organism gives unity to the forces conditioning it.. . 
(Sartre, 1991 :364; emphasis in original) 
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Language, on Sartre's reading, signals generations of labour carried out on it 
(Sartre, 1991:364). 
Put another way, Sartre describes the 'word' as 'perpetually serializing and 
institutional' (1991:426). It is 'the others in the series' which give the word its 
meaning which in the process 'escapes from me'. The word is 'institutional' as a 
result of it tending to create reciprocity. Sartre describes the word as acting in the 
manner of a third party. That is, communication is not effected through the word, 
but as reference to the word. 
Sartre's concept of 'series' is that they have an historical life. For example, he 
contends that linguistics: 
... acts serially upon the totality in interiority. But it is itself, in 
its life, provoked to its serial action by the action of groups or 
series. So the ensemble of the system, manifesting itself as an 
action on the series, results in a serial response which deforms it 
( even if it is confirming: there is always a deviation) . (Sartre, 
1991 :432; emphasis in original) 
Concepts, for Sartre, necessarily expressed by language, always introduce ' ... the 
time of their object into the thought of that object' (Hendley, 1991:116). Sartre 
made a distinction between the terms, ' concept' and 'notion' : 
A concept is a way of defining things from the outside, and it is 
atemporal. A notion, as I see it, is a way of defining things from 
the inside, and it includes not only the time of the object about 
which we have a notion, but also its own time of knowledge. In 
other words, it is a thought which carries time within itself. 
(Sartre, 1977: 113) 
I find Sartre's differentiation of 'notion' from 'concept' unconvincing. Whilst I 
accept that 'notion' consists of an historical reference in addition to a present time 
reference, I contend that the same exists for any 'concept' we may have. That is, 
a concept obviously has referral to past ideas, times and traditions, but cannot 
escape present time 'contamination' as well. And I want to suggest that a concept 
cannot be defined solely 'from the outside' . 
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In Search for a Method, Sartre insisted that 'Our historical task ... is to bring 
closer the moment when History will have only one meaning ... ' (1963 :52). For 
Sartre, this task was possible and should also be the motivation for others. 
Unfortunately, he did not outline how it would be possible for history to have a 
single meaning, nor why it is so important. 
1.6 The matter of 'truth' 
In response to criticisms that existentialism is a philosophy of quietism, Sartre 
replies that this cannot be so because existentialism defines the subject by the 
action of the subject. He also suggests that this is the very point of difference 
between the Christian and atheist versions of existentialism. That is, the emphasis 
which atheistic existentialism gives to the subjectivity of the individual: 
. . . we seek to base our findings on the truth, and not upon a 
collection of fine theories, full of hope but lacking real 
foundations. And at the point of departure there cannot be any 
other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which is the 
absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself ... Before 
there can be any truth whatever, then, there must be an 
absolute truth, and there is such a truth which is simple .. . It 
consists of one ' s immediate sense of one ' s self. (Sartre, 
1948:44) 
For the subject, to know that it exists, is to know the truth. Sartre, together with 
Heidegger and Kierkegaard before him, believed that the subject's central and 
most basic anxiety is to feel and know that it exists. The subject has a 
' transcendent need and desire' to know this. Hope for the subject lies in the 
realization of this truth. 
However, Hendley (1991:21) reminds us that for Sartre: 
There can be ... no knowledge of a situation independent of the 
historical praxis that is productively engaged to it. With such an 
intimate link to praxis, how could knowledge ever hope to aspire 
to a truth that would transcend its historical specificity? 
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Hendley seems to be saying that Sartre is suggesting the possibility of 
transcendence over 'historical specificity' . This is not the case. Sartre makes it 
quite clear in Search for a Method (1963) that the ' experimenter' and the 
' experimental system' are inextricably linked: 
The only theory of knowledge which can be valid today is the 
one which is founded on that truth of microphysics: the 
experimenter is part of the experimental system . . . the 
revelation of a situation is effected in and through the praxis 
which changes it. (Sartre, 1963:33 ; emphasis in original) 
It is Sartre ' s contention that atheistic existentialism finds it ' extremely 
embarrassing' that there is no God. Atheistic existentialism recognizes that it is 
attractive to believe in a 'perfect consciousness', an infinite and a priori ' good'. 
But because God does not exist, no longer can the subject yearn for an ' intelligible 
heaven'. 
This theory of existentialism, according to Sartre, is the only theory which affords 
dignity to the individual, for it is the only theory which does not treat the subject 
as an object. Sartre accuses all kinds of materialism of doing just that, relegating 
the status of subject to that of object. In place of the 'material world ' Sartre 
claims the aim of existentialism is to establish the ' human kingdom' (1948:45). 
Sartre is not claiming that subjectivity is solely an individual subjectivity: 'The 
subjectivity which we postulate as the standard of truth is no narrowly individual 
subjectivism ... It is not only one's own self that one discovers in the cognito, but 
those of others too' (1948:45). Every ' truth' (the subject sensing itself) and every 
action imply both subjectivity and the environment. 
Even though Sartre speaks of an 'absolute truth' which he defines as one's sense 
of oneself, he does claim that that truth is a truth which emerges, which 'becomes' 
(Sartre, 1963 :x) . Secondly, Sartre contends that truth must become totalization: 'I 
have taken it for granted that such a totalization is perpetually in progress as 
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History and as historical Truth' (1963:x). For Sartre, then, history changes 
through a continuous, repeating process of a dialectical relationship between 
contradictions and synthesis. A synthesis is the temporary resolution of 
contradictions until new contradictions arise and are temporarily resolved by a 
new synthesis. 
So the relationship between ' historical totalization and totalizing Truth' is a 
relationship in perpetual motion. It is the relationship between being ( etre) and 
knowing (savoir) , and is called reason (raison). It is important to acknowledge, 
therefore, that reason, or perceived reality, is about the connection between 
apparent objectivity and the method of knowing to which we have referred above 
in this Chapter. 
Sartre's understanding of ' truth ' is most clear in the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason (1991, Volume 2): ' .. . historians cannot look at things from the standpoint 
of the inhuman in order to know and comprehend historical reality' (1991:302, 
emphasis in original). Sartre proposes that there are two means by which we 
attempt to ' de-situate' ourselves with respect to the object. One way is lo lurn 
ourselves into 'Nature ' and see ourselves as producing history and, the second 
way, is to ' reject the situation of reciprocity ' . This means to view the research 
and the research topic as being separate from any historical influences. Sartre 
asserts that both of these methods of de-situation result in 'positing objectivity' . 
By this he means that in both cases it is the ' absolute object disclosing itself as an 
absolute reality' (Sartre, 1991 :302; emphasis in original). If the researcher is de-
situated from the object, the object loses ' .. . part of its qualification, its human 
meaning, but wins (illusorily, of course) the absolute autonomy of its being' 
(1991 :302, emphasis in original): 
The dialectic [can] not be the object of a critical investigation 
outside the practical milieu of which it is simultaneously the 
action (inasmuch as it gives itself its own laws), the knowledge 
(as dialectical control of action by itself) and the cognitive law 
(inasmuch as knowledge of the dialectic requires a dialectical 
temporalization of knowledge) . (Sartre, 1991:203) 
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Arlette Elkaim-Sartre in the Preface to Critique of Dialectical Reason posits that it 
was Sartre's intention, by the end of the second volume of the above, to find an 
answer to the question: Does history have a meaning? The second volume was 
drafted in 1958, but was never finished (Elkaim-Sartre, 1991 :ix). 
1. 7 Discussion 
In this section we will look at the apparent contradictions and unanswered 
questions in the work of Jean Paul Sartre, and we will also ask how Sartre would 
respond to the question: Prisoners of our own Consciousness? 
Obviously, this Chapter does not pretend to faithfully portray the complete works 
of Jean Paul Sartre. In some instances where I have identified apparent anomalies 
in his work, it may well be that particular concepts under investigation have been 
more fully explained elsewhere. Further, some of the apparent contradictions in 
Sartre ' s thought may merely be the development of ideas from one period to 
another. Such a change in Sartre ' s thought is surely both expected and a healthy 
indication of further development. However, what are set out below for further 
discussion are specific claims which appear to be contradictory or which lack 
clarification, and which are particularly pertinent to the question: Prisoners of our 
own Consciousness? 
In his argument regarding existentialism versus the social sciences it does seem as 
though Sartre has fallen into a fallacy similar to the one to which he says the 
social sciences have succumbed. That is, Sartre holds that notions of collective 
structures such as found in the social sciences ( collective consciousness, social 
forces, class structure) ' betray the concrete experience of human life', leading to 
an illusion of objectivity (Hayim, 1996: 136). Could not the criticism of giving 
phenomena the illusion of objectivity which he lays at the door of social sciences 
not also be laid at the door of existentialism? The notion that the phenomena may 
'belong' to different sciences is, I would suggest, irrelevant. In other words, the 
first grouping may belong to the social sciences, but does not the second grouping 
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(human condition, consc10usness, human freedom) 'belong' to psychology or 
existentialism? It is 'objectification' which is Sartre's main concern here. But is 
not objectification inescapable, even when using the regression-progression 
model which Sartre promulgates? Indeed, had not Sartre already alerted us to the 
inescapable illusion of objectivity when the reflecting consciousness reflects upon 
reflected consciousness? Sartre took pains to explain how in the very act of 
reflection, consciousness becomes a reflecting subject (1987:xi). 
Sartre despairs of the alleged 'hidden realities ' in the social sciences. These are 
the collective structures referred to above. What Sartre proposes is that the 
subject be understood from the position of concrete human behaviour in actual 
historical circumstances. What possibility is there of this occurring? In my view, 
the possibility seems remote. Firstly, in practical terms it appears impossible, but 
even if it were possible, there would be an inability to generalize as each event 
must be examined in its own context. While that might be ideal, in order to 
converse about human subjects ' needs we must generalize and categorize, but not 
necessarily universalize. Sartre would criticize this action as objectification, but I 
see no escape. 
On the question of the definition of the subject, Sartre does not see a 'universal 
essence ' in the subject which would allow him to define the subject as having a 
' human nature '. However, he is comfortable with the notion that the subject has a 
' human universality of condition' (1948:46). Is there an essential difference in 
meaning between the two concepts? It is difficult to distinguish the difference in 
meaning here, at least when using common sense language. Further, does not 
Sartre contradict himself by saying: 'By nature the Ego is fleeting'? (1957:70, 
emphasis added). 
It is in Sartre's definition of consciousness that I find most problematic. On the 
one hand, in saying that the subject's free choice not only commits the subject but 
makes a commitment for the whole of humanity, Sartre does seem to be giving 
recognition to the dialectical relationship between the subject and social function. 
But he does not elaborate on this relationship, on how the relationship works, and 
just what is the influence of one on the other. In fact, in earlier writings, Sartre 
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(1956, 1957 and 1973) is somewhat silent regarding any reciprocal relationship at 
all. That is, the individual commits the whole of humanity by its action, but what 
influence does the 'whole of humanity' have on the subject? 
To be fair, in the Critique of Dialectical Reason (1991 ), Sartre does refer to the 
dialectical relationship between 'objective realities' and the method of knowing. 
However, he does not ever appear to abandon his claim that consciousness has no 
causal involvement, that it is nothingness (neant). If he argues that there is a 
dialectical relationship between the perceived object and the method of knowing, 
surely there is some sort of causal relationship here? This lack of clarity overflows 
into Sartre ' s discussion on the autonomy of the subject and his claims about truth. 
Concerning Sartre 's notion of free commitments fashioning not only the subject 
but also humanity as a whole, two points arise: one pertaining to the nature of 
autonomy, and the other, again, pertaining to Sartre 's notion of consciousness 
having no causal influence. Taking Sartre ' s contention that the subject is free 
within human subjectivity, is he not underestimating the influences on that subject 
(for I am not sure that h~ daims that the sum total of ali that exists is human 
subjectivity)? In underestimating the influences on the subject, is Sartre not 
overestimating the degree of autonomy that the subject has? Again, we need to 
return to our difficulty with Sartre's notion that consciousness has no causal 
involvements. In believing that in making a commitment of choice, that choice 
not only fashions the subject but also fashions humanity, is that not also saying 
that there is some relationship which looks very much like 'causal involvement' in 
the consciousness of the individual and, in turn, in humanity as a whole? As we 
have seen, Sartre was adamant that no causal involvement existed. 
On the autonomy of the subject, Sartre's notions of the subject being 'condemned 
to be free', of not creating itself, of being 'thrown into the world', are somewhat 
puzzling. There is a strong suggestion that someone else must be doing the 
condemning, the creating and the throwing. And yet, this is not the message 
Sartre is intending to give, that there is someone or anything outside human 
subjectivity. The subject, he has told us, is merely a sum of relations of 
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undertakings. Why has Sartre used terminology which gives the impression of an 
'outsider' taking action on the subject? Why is the terminology used in a 
pejorative sense - ' condemned' , 'thrown' ? These terms give rise to a suspicion 
that Sartre is referring to an absolute ' truth' from which the subject is being 
detained. However, while Sartre does argue that there is an absolute truth, as we 
have seen, he defines that truth as continuously emerging and being nothing other 
than 'one's immediate sense of oneself' (1948:44; emphasis in original). 
So what is Sartre ' s response to our question: 'Prisoners of our own 
Consciousness?' It is clear that Sartre ' s intended message is: the subject is free, 
the subject has no legislator other than itself. There is no determinism. The 
subject is responsible for all actions it takes. It is clear that the intended message 
is also: consciousness escapes identity. The moment the reflecting consciousness 
(the subject) reflects on reflected consciousness (the object), it becomes 
unreflected consciousness and a new action. Taking our own question: Prisoners 
of our own Consciousness?, Sartre, on the one hand, would have to disagree with 
the prospect because his argument is that consciousness has no causal 
involvements. Therefore, it is impossible for our consciousness to imprison us in 
any way. All consciousness involves choice. But it is the contradictory nature of 
Sartre ' s comments which gets us into trouble here. We recall that Sartre claims 
the subject is ' condemned to be free ' from the moment the subject is ' thrown into 
this world ' (1948:34). The ' agent' doing the condemning remains a mystery. 
We have also seen that while Sartre argued that the subject is free and is its own 
legislator, he also, at least by 1960 in Critique de la Raison Dialectique, 
commented on social structures having such an influence that the subject could 
suffer from loss of self-identity. What we may be facing here is a Sartrean 
argument for the ideal, that is, total freedom of the subject, but he does seem to 
recognize, albeit less vociferously and somewhat against his will, that social 
forces have a major influence. 
I suggest there is a similarity between the two concepts - 'prisoners of our own 
consciousness' and ' condemned to be free'. Sartre' s intended messages relating 
to the subjects' freedom are somewhat weakened by the haunting realization of 
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the strength and influence of social forces. Perhaps the agent responsible for the 
imprisoning and the condemning is none other than 'social forces'? 
